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Richard j. Lazarus 
 
Docket Capture at the High Court 
 
The declining number of cases on the Supreme Court’s plenary docket may 
or may not be a problem. After all, there are many good reasons that such a 
decline could be happening, including the obvious possibility that the Court 
was previously hearing too many cases that did not warrant plenary review and 
is now doing a better, not worse, job of picking cases. But while having fewer 
cases is not necessarily problematic, what is worrisome is the very real 
possibility that the Court’s plenary docket is increasingly captured by an elite 
group of expert Supreme Court advocates, dominated by those in the private 
bar. The same way that powerful economic interests can capture an agency
1 or 
any other entity that purports to exercise authority over those  interests,
2 so too 
may the Supreme Court’s docket be “captured” by the more powerful 
economic interests that know best how to influence the decisionmaking of the 
Justices at the jurisdictional stage. It is, accordingly, not the number of cases on 
the plenary docket but rather their content that is the real problem.
3 
 
1.  M ARVER  H.  BERNSTEIN,  REGULATING  BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT  COMMISSION (1955); 
Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the 
Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952). See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (discussing how the state can be used by 
an industry or group for its own purposes).   
2.   Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, 
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 213-14 (2003) (“If 
administrative regulators are vulnerable to the forces of capture by certain interests, as most 
everyone agrees they are, then the likelihood of a deeper capture seems undeniable. There is 
nothing special about administrative regulators—except, perhaps, the general concern that 
they may be captured. Virtually every other institution in our society seems just as 
vulnerable.”). 
3.   This Essay builds upon ideas and statistics set forth more fully in an earlier article that 
discusses the significance of the emergence of a modern Supreme Court bar, but without a 
discrete focus on the Court’s plenary docket and its capture. See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy 
Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008). the yale law journal online  119:89  2009 
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i. the rising influence of the supreme court bar at the 
jurisdictional stage  
The statistics are striking. While the number of merits cases has roughly 
declined by one half during the past three decades, the influence of the expert 
Supreme Court bar over the plenary docket during this same time period has 
increased approximately tenfold; expert practitioners now represent the 
successful petitioner at the jurisdictional stage in more than fifty percent of the 
cases. What is the basis of this measurement? I examined the petitions granted 
plenary review in several Supreme Court Terms, ranging back to October 
Term 1980 and extending to the most recently completed October Term 2008. 
I deliberately eliminated from consideration cases in which the Solicitor 
General was the petitioner or one of the petitioners because her influence is 
well established. And, I chose a fairly tough measure of what it means to be an 
“expert Supreme Court advocate”: an attorney either has to have presented at 
least five oral arguments before the Court or be affiliated with a practice whose 
current members have argued at least ten cases.   Based on this measure, expert 
Supreme Court advocates were responsible for 5.8% (6 of 102 cases) of the 
petitions granted plenary review during October Term 1980.
4 By October 
Term 2000, that same percentage had increased to 25% (seventeen of sixty-
eight cases) and has steadily increased since—36% in October Term 2005 and 
44% in October Term 2006—to boast more than 50% of the Court’s docket 
during both the most recently completed October Terms 2007 (53.8%) and 
2008 (55.5%).
5 I do not doubt that there is some inexactitude at the margins in 
counting cases and oral arguments and comparing Supreme Court Terms, but 
these trends are beyond marginal. They reflect a shift of an order of magnitude. 
Why should we worry?   Good advocacy is not a bad thing, of course, and it 
should not be especially surprising to discover that those who are more 
experienced advocates before the Court are especially successful in persuading 
the Court to grant their certiorari petitions. What is worrisome is the potential 
for an undesirable skewing in the content of the Court’s docket. The public 
should expect that the Court will devote its limited resources to address the 
legal issues that are truly the most important for the nation rather than those 
 
4.  Id. at 1515-16. 
5.  Id.  at 1516. My earlier article was published at the close of October Term 2007. I recently 
examined all the cases heard for oral argument during the more recently completed October 
Term 2008. A couple of the cases, as almost always tends to happen, defied easy 
classification, but my review of those cases concluded that out of a total of sixty-three non-
Solicitor General cases heard on the merits, expert advocates had filed the petitions in thirty-
five of those cases, or 55.5%. docket capture at the high court 
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legal issues important to those who can secure representation of their interests 
by the Supreme Court bar. 
ii. the environmental law cases of october term 2008 
It is not numbers alone that strongly suggest that the private Supreme 
Court bar is increasingly capturing the Court’s docket. A look at the cases 
themselves reinforces that suggestion. As described further below, the Court 
regularly grants cases at the urging of leading members of the private sector 
Supreme Court bar that are marginally certiorari worthy at best, at a time when 
the rates of granting certiorari are otherwise rapidly declining. No one may be 
more skilled in this respect right now than Sidley Austin’s Supreme Court 
practice, as underscored by the extraordinary number of cases arising under the 
Federal Employer Liability Act in which the firm has obtained High Court 
review on behalf of railroad clients.
6 
Especially illustrative are the environmental cases from October Term 
2008. For the first time, a series of industry clients last Term turned repeatedly 
to the expert Supreme Court bar for assistance in a host of cases arising under 
federal pollution control laws.
7 The result was palpable and formed the basis of 
the best Term that industry has ever enjoyed before the Court in 
environmental cases.
8 
The Court granted review in four cases that, absent the involvement of 
expert practitioners, would not have seemed to have had a remote chance of 
review. Two were Clean Water Act cases (Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.
9 and 
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council
10) in which industry 
parties were merely intervenors in the lower courts and the federal agency that 
had lost the case declined to petition on its own and opposed Supreme Court 
review.
11 Such federal opposition is almost always the death knell of a petition. 
 
6.  Lazarus,  supra note 3, at 1537-39 (describing Phillips’s successful Federal Employer Liability 
Act petitions for certiorari). 
7.  Richard  Lazarus,  The Age of the Expert Advocate, 25 ENVTL. F. 12 (2008).   
8.  Marcia  Coyle,  High Court Losses Stun Environmentalists, NAT’L  L.J. (June 29, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431807260; Richard Lazarus, 
Environmentalists Lose Every Case, 26 ENVTL. F. 12 (2009). 
9.   129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009). I should disclose that I served as counsel of record for the 
environmental respondents in this case at the merits stage. 
10.   129 S. Ct. 2180 (2009). 
11.  See  Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, Coeur Alaska, Inc., v. Se. Alaska 
Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2180 (2009) (Nos. 07-984 & 07-990); Brief for the Federal 
Respondents in Opposition, Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009) 
(Nos. 07-588, 07-589, & 07-597). Note that the federal government is a named “respondent” the yale law journal online  119:89  2009 
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If the Solicitor General is advising the Court that the federal agency that lost 
below is not seeking review that tends to end the matter. In one of those cases 
(Entergy), not only was there no circuit court conflict, but the lower court 
ruling was the first court of appeals ever to construe statutory language that 
has been on the books for more than thirty-six years. The third and fourth 
cases, Burlington Northern & San Francisco Railroad v. United States and Shell Oil 
v. United States,
12 both arose under the federal Superfund law and raised legal 
issues of diminishing practical significance the Court declined to hear for 
decades.
13 Not only is Superfund a retrospective liability law that has naturally 
dissipated in its application over time, but Congress has declined since 1995 to 
reauthorize the federal tax that funds the Act, so resources for the law’s 
administration have been running out ever since.
14 
In all four cases, a high-profile member of the private Supreme Court bar 
served as lead counsel for industry petitioners: Maureen Mahoney in Entergy 
and  Burlington Northern, Ted Olson in Coeur Alaska, Inc., and Kathleen 
Sullivan in Shell Oil. The bar’s coup de grâce last Term, however, was the 
Court’s denial of the Solicitor General’s petition in yet another Clean Water 
Act case, McWane, Inc. v. United States. McWane presented all the traditional 
criteria of a case warranting review—an express, deep, and wide conflict in the 
circuits regarding a legal issue of national importance; yet, the Court denied 
review after Ted Olson’s partner at Gibson Dunn, Miguel Estrada, filed an 
 
in both cases only because it declined to petition and opposed the petition. On the merits in 
both cases, the government was aligned with the industry petitioner both in the lower 
courts and in the Supreme Court. 
12.   The Court consolidated these two cases for purposes of oral argument and the Court’s 
opinion. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009). 
13.   For instance, the primary case upon which petitioners relied upon for their assertion of a 
circuit conflict in Burlington Northern was the Fifth Circuit’s 1993 ruling in In re Bell 
Petroleum Services, Inc., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993). See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26-
28, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009) (No. 07-
1601). Bell Petroleum was long an outlier in the lower federal courts and created the potential 
for an argument of a circuit conflict, yet no one before Burlington Northern effectively used 
that precedent as an effective basis for securing Supreme Court review of the joint and 
several liability issue ultimately reviewed in Burlington Northern. See, e.g., United States v. 
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1103 (2004). 
14.  R OBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 394 
(6th ed. 2009). Congress enacted the Superfund law, formally known as the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), in December 1980. 
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). CERCLA primarily aims to clean up abandoned 
and inactive hazardous waste sites by imposing liability for such cleanup on a series of 
statutorily designated potentially responsible parties. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall 
Servs., 543 U.S. 157, 161 (2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006)); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra, at 
393-98. As many of those sites have been cleaned up during the past several decades, 
CERCLA’s exigency has necessarily lessened. docket capture at the high court 
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especially skillful brief in opposition to the government’s petition.
15 There is 
hardly anything in Supreme Court advocacy as difficult as obtaining plenary 
review, but defeating a Solicitor General’s petition runs a close second. The 
Court grants the Solicitor General’s petitions for writ of certiorari about 
seventy percent of the time compared to between three and four percent for 
others.
16 
iii. the susceptibility to capture of the court’s 
jurisdictional decisionmaking 
Some might respond that even if the Court’s plenary docket has been 
captured, this is not the result of a hostile takeover. Any such development, it 
could be contended, results from the predilections of business-friendly 
members of the Court rather than the heightened skills of the advocates. Such 
an assessment, however, would both overestimate the role Justices play at the 
jurisdictional stage and underestimate the influence of the advocates. To be 
sure, the Justices—and not the advocates—are the ones with the votes 
necessary to grant certiorari. But the Justices are far more dependent on the 
skills of the advocates than is routinely appreciated. 
Even with the introduction of the “cert” pool, neither the Justices nor their 
clerks can in fact spend significant time evaluating the certiorari worthiness of 
the literally thousands of petitions that must be reviewed. Once one subtracts 
the significant time necessary to decide increasingly complex merits cases and 
the other activities of a Justice these days, the clerks can spend on average only 
minutes for each cert pool memo, or at most a few hours for a handful. The 
Justices have, in theory, at most only a few minutes to review a petition and 
may in fact never read the petitions themselves.
17 The Justices instead delegate 
the task to their law clerks—inexperienced recent law school graduates who 
lack both the requisite background and time necessary to consider the 
competing legal arguments on the merits, and to evaluate in a truly informed 
and independent manner the petitioner’s claims of circuit conflict and practical 
importance.
18 
 
15.  See McWane, Inc. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 630 (2008); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
McWane, 129 S. Ct. 630 (No. 08-223); Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, McWane, 
129 S. Ct. 630 (No. 08-223). 
16.  Lazarus,  supra note 3, at 1493.    
17.   Carter Phillips, Remarks at the Yale Law School Supreme Court Advocacy Conference: 
Important Questions of Federal Law—Assessing the Supreme Court’s Case Selection 
Process (Sept. 18, 2009). 
18.  See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 1524-25.    the yale law journal online  119:89  2009 
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The upshot is a huge tactical advantage for those attorneys who know best 
how to pitch their cases to the law clerks. The expert attorneys know the trends 
in the Court’s recent precedent and the predilections of each individual Justice 
as evidenced in recent oral argument transcripts, speeches, and writings. 
Having once served as Supreme Court clerks themselves, the experts are also 
well versed in the generic limitations, susceptibilities, and tendencies of the 
clerks. 
Their expertise extends to the securing of multiple amicus briefs at the 
jurisdictional stage in support of their request for the Court’s plenary review. 
They appreciate how amicus support substantiates their assertions regarding 
the importance of the legal issues proffered for review. And they have the 
professional connections with other members of the Supreme Court bar and 
the economic clout to generate the necessary amicus submissions.
19 If news 
article and op-ed columns contemporaneous to the Court’s jurisdictional 
determination might be helpful, they can and will obtain them.
20 
The expert advocates also invariably enjoy an advantage by dint of their 
sheer celebrity, at least within the confines of One First Street, N.E. The clerks 
know of the outstanding reputation of these expert advocates for working on 
important Supreme Court cases. Many of the clerks hope to and do in fact 
work for these experts’ law firms immediately or soon after their clerkships.
21 
And, for no reason more than the appearance of the name of the advocate on 
the cover of the brief, their petitions will receive more attention and respect.
22 
This is not an incidental advantage. In the barrage of petitions under review, 
 
19.  Id.  at 1528-29. 
20.  Id.  at 1525. 
21.   For instance, a cursory review of the firms at which those who clerked for the Court during 
the 2007-2008 Term currently work shows a remarkable number at law firms with leading 
Supreme Court practices, even though those clerks cannot under Court rules work on 
Supreme Court cases until two years after the clerkship has ended. See SUP. CT. R. 7. Three 
law clerks from that single Term are working for Sidley Austin (Carter Phillips), three for 
Kirkland & Ellis (Ken Starr), two for O’Melveny & Myers (Walter Dellinger), two for King 
& Spalding (Paul Clement), two for WilmerHale (Seth Waxman), and one each for Jones 
Day, Arnold & Porter, and Robbins Russell. Nor is this trend an aberration. There are 
currently nine attorneys at WilmerHale and seven attorneys at Sidley Austin who clerked for 
the Court dating back to October Term 2003, which understates the trend because several 
former clerks who worked for those firms have undoubtedly since left, including to work for 
the Obama Administration. Three clerks from the most recently completed October Term 
2008 now work for Kellogg Huber, whose Supreme Court practice is headed by David 
Frederick and who won several significant cases that Term, including Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. 
Ct. 1187 (2009). See Tony Mauro, A Low-Profile Ride to Top of High Court Bar, NAT’L L.J., 
Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202428981439.  
22.  Lazarus, supra note 3, at 1526. docket capture at the high court 
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visibility alone can make all the difference at the jurisdictional stage, especially 
when buttressed by multiple amicus briefs supporting plenary review. 
The effect is twofold. Not only are the expert Supreme Court counsel able 
to make their petitions seem more compelling, but they are simultaneously able 
t o  m a k e  p e t i t i o n s  f i l e d  b y  o t h e r s  l e s s  e x p e r t  s e e m  r e l a t i v e l y  w e a k e r  b y  
comparison. The experts have, in practical effect, raised the bar for Supreme 
Court review through their outstanding presentations and significant amicus 
support. 
iv. reforming the court’s decisionmaking process at the 
jurisdictional stage 
The question is what, if anything, to do about the disproportionate 
influence the high Court bar increasingly has on the Court’s plenary docket. A 
full answer to that question, however, lies far beyond the purpose of this Essay, 
which seeks to initiate, and not end, the conversation.
23  Nonetheless, I offer a 
few preliminary thoughts. First, part of the answer could, of course, be to 
improve the Supreme Court advocacy available to a wide range of interests 
beyond those who can afford to pay its market value. Mitigation already occurs 
to an extent as reflected in the private bar’s willingness to offer pro bono 
services, the development of expert solicitors general in many states, and the 
recent emergence of Supreme Court clinics in several of the nation’s leading 
law schools.
24 
But, such mitigating efforts fall far short of filling the gap between those 
who have access to the resources of the expert Supreme Court bar and those 
who do not. Much of the private law firm pro bono effort occurs at the merits 
stage rather than at the certiorari stage and there are many subject matters 
(e.g., environmental, employment discrimination) that the private bar, because 
of conflicts with paying clients, will not take up, including when they oversee 
the law school Supreme Court clinics.
25 It is undeniably a positive development 
to have the states represented more effectively than in the past, but they too are 
 
23.   My remarks at the Yale Supreme Court Advocacy Clinic Conference where this paper was 
first presented were directed to the threshold question of what problem exists with the 
Court’s current plenary docket. Subsequent panels and papers were directed to the 
antecedent question of how, if at all, the Court’s case selection process should be reformed. 
24.  Lazarus,  supra note 3, at 1557-60. For instance, the Stanford Supreme Court Litigation Clinic 
was co-counsel for the successful petitioner at the jurisdictional stage in at least four cases 
heard during October Term 2008. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 
(2009); Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009); Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 
1769 (2009); Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).    
25.  Lazarus,  supra note 3, at 1560.    the yale law journal online  119:89  2009 
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limited in their perspective and, for instance, may deepen rather than reduce 
the advocacy gap existing in criminal cases. Finally, the Supreme Court clinics 
offer some promise, but law students even at schools like Harvard, 
Northwestern, Stanford, Texas, Virginia, and Yale are still just that: students. 
The disproportionate influence that the expert Supreme Court bar exerts 
on the content of the Court’s plenary docket is the problem, not solved by 
which cases the bar takes—business or public interest—but by the Court itself 
asserting more control. For this reason, I expect the fuller solution to the 
docket capture problem will be found, by analogy, to the kinds of structural 
reforms that have been made in administrative agencies to reduce the risk of 
agency capture. 
As applied to the Court, such reforms would require changes in the Court’s 
internal decisionmaking process at the cert stage. The place to start is 
questioning the existing cert pool as the primary basis for evaluating which 
cases warrant plenary review. As currently structured, the law clerks lack the 
time, experience, and resources at the jurisdictional stage to evaluate in a 
meaningful way the claims made by expert counsel or to make up for the 
deficits of below-par counsel. 
At the Yale Law School Supreme Court Advocacy Clinic Conference on the 
Court’s case selection process, speakers and audience participants suggested 
several preliminary ideas. One modest recommendation would be to replace 
the existing single cert pool with two competing cert pools, thereby increasing 
the number of clerks who provide a petition with a close review. Another 
would be the introduction of a two-step process to jurisdictional review in 
which the clerks would first identify potentially cert-worthy cases and then 
next examine that smaller subset of petitions more closely prior to 
recommending in favor of certiorari. 
A more ambitious reform would be for the Justices to be more willing at 
the jurisdictional stage to seek input from those outside the Court who are 
knowledgeable about the issues raised by a pending petition. The Court 
currently seeks such input several times a year on pending petitions, but 
exclusively from the Solicitor General by way of formal orders inviting the 
Solicitor General to express the views of the United States on a pending 
petition.
26  The Court could make similar requests from other knowledgeable 
organizations as a method of ensuring the wisdom of the Court’s jurisdictional 
determinations. 
 
26.  David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court 
Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor 
General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 242 (2009). docket capture at the high court 
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An even more dramatic structural reform would be the addition to the 
Court of an office of seasoned, career lawyers akin in skills to assistants to the 
Solicitor General; the attorneys in such an office would assist the Court at the 
jurisdictional stage in assessing the worthiness of cases for judicial review, by 
both questioning the exaggerated claims of some advocates and making up for 
the deficiencies of other advocates. Whatever the best approach, it is 
increasingly likely that the current potential for capture of the Court’s docket is 
a significant problem that warrants the Court’s attention. 
 
Richard J. Lazarus is the Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center & 
Faculty Director, Georgetown University Supreme Court Institute. This paper was 
based on a talk delivered at the Yale Law School Supreme Court Advocacy Clinic and 
The Yale Law Journal Online Conference on Important Questions of Federal Law: 
Assessing the Supreme Court’s Case Selection Process, held in Washington, D.C., on 
September 18, 2009. 
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